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Introduction
In recent years, the renewed strength of immigration to the United States has sparked a
debate about the economic effects of immigration.  A central issue in this debate has been the
fiscal impact of immigrants.  Most research in this area has adopted a static, cross-section
approach in assessing the net impact of immigrants on the economy’s fiscal position.
1  However,
recent work has extended this perspective to consider the impact of immigrants over time.  A
dynamic approach is important because of the age dependency of tax and expenditure programs,
and the necessity to take the descendents of immigrants into account.  For example, a large
working-age immigrant population might appear from cross-section analysis to lessen the fiscal
burden of a pay-as-you-go social security pension system, even if these immigrants will
eventually receive benefits from the system that exceed the taxes they pay, in present value.  On
the other hand, a large population of school-age immigrants might appear to add fiscal pressure
via added expenditures, even if the subsequent income taxes paid by them in their adulthood and
by their native offspring more than compensate for the increased spending.
A key contribution adopting such a dynamic approach (National Research Council, 1997,
Chapter 7, based largely on Lee and Miller, 1997) reached the conclusion that U.S. immigrants
provide a net fiscal benefit in present value, when account is taken of their own impact on tax
receipts, transfers and government purchases, as well as the impact of their descendents.
However, this finding hinged on the assumption that government would shift its fiscal policy to a
sustainable path by stabilizing its national debt-GDP ratio and thereby raising the net tax burdens
on all individuals, including immigrants.  Under the assumption of no change in policy (an
                                               
1 This line of research is surveyed in National Research Council (1997), Chapter 6.2
unsustainable situation), immigrants’ contributions were projected to be slightly negative,
indicating that whether immigration is “part of the problem” or “part of the solution” depends on
whether there is a solution, or just a problem.
This paper reconsiders the fiscal impact of immigrants over time, using the technique of
generational accounting introduced by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991) and applied
subsequently by a number of others.
2  In stressing the impact of policy on the relative burdens of
different age cohorts, generational accounting produces a measure of fiscal imbalance that is
independent of the accounting conventions used to measure national debt.  Of particular value in
the present context is that it permits us to consider not only the net contribution of immigrants to
fiscal balance, but also the size of this impact relative to the overall imbalance.  Generational
accounting also allows us to compare changes in immigration policy to other policies in terms of
their impact on fiscal balance and the welfare of different generations.
In performing this analysis, another of the paper’s contributions is its adaptation of the
generational accounting methodology to accommodate the presence of immigrants and
immigration.  In the past, generational accounts have typically ignored immigration, treating
population changes resulting from immigration as if they resulted from a decline in mortality
among natives in the immigrant’s generation. That is, all members of a given generation at each
age were treated as survivors among the original U.S. residents of that generation.  Thus, each
generation’s account included the projected taxes and transfers of subsequent immigrants of the
same cohort, and therefore did not reflect the net fiscal burdens of current residents of that
generation.  For example, if immigrants were primarily aged, and received certain old-age
benefits, these benefits would have been treated as additional transfer payments to current
                                               
2 For a recent compilation, see Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999).3
residents, leading to an understatement of the typical resident’s lifetime fiscal burden.  For
countries with significant immigrant populations, such a procedure could provide a distorted
picture of the fiscal burdens of current generations and hence of the relative gap between current
and future generations implied by a given fiscal policy.
Because of the importance of this change in methodology, we begin our presentation in
the next section with a description of the new approach to generational accounting and a
comparison of this approach with the previous one.  After discussing our data sources, we turn
then to an analysis of the impact of immigration to the United States on fiscal balance and
generational burdens.
Generational Accounting: Existing Methodology
We begin with a brief review of the standard generational accounting methodology.  For
further discussion, the reader is referred to Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991) or Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1999).
Generational accounting is based on the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.
This constraint, written as equation (1), requires that the present value of all future net tax
payments made by current and future generations must be sufficient to cover the present value of
future government consumption as well as service the government’s initial net indebtedness.
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3 The constraint does not assume that government debt is ever fully paid off, merely that the debt grows less quickly
than the rate of discount, i.e., it does not explode.  Thus, it is consistent with the long-run existence of government
deficits, as long as these deficits are smaller than the amount needed simply to service the level of outstanding debt.4
The first summation on the left-hand side of (1) adds together the generational accounts (the
present value of the remaining lifetime net payments) of existing generations.  The term Nt,t-s
stands for the account of the generation born in year t-s.  The index s in this summation runs
from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life.
4    
The second summation on the left side of (1) adds together the present values of
remaining net payments of future generations, with s representing the number of years after year
t that the generation is born.  The first term on the right hand side of (1) expresses the present
value of government consumption.  In this summation the values of government consumption in
year s, given by Gs, are discounted by the pre-tax real interest rate, r.  The remaining term on the
left hand side, 
g
t W , denotes the government’s net wealth in year t – its assets minus its explicit
debt.  As in past applications, we ignore real government assets and the flows from such assets in
calculating Gs and 
g
t W , so that the latter simply corresponds to minus the value of government
debt.
Equation (1) indicates the zero sum nature of intergenerational fiscal policy.  Holding the
present value of government consumption fixed, a reduction in the present value of net taxes
extracted from current generations (a decline in the first summation on the left side of (1))
necessitates an increase in the present value of net tax payments of future generations.
The term Nt,k is defined by:
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4 Hence, the first element of this summation is Nt,t, which is the present value of net payments of the generation born
in year t; the last term is Nt,t-D, the present value of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year t,
namely those born in year t-D.5
where k = max(t,k).  For generations born prior to year t, the summation begins in year t.  For
generations born in year k > t, the summation begins in year k.
In expression (2) Ts,k stands for the projected average net tax payment made to the
government in year s by a member of the generation born in year k. 
 The term Ps,k stands for the
number of residents in year s belonging to the cohort born in year k.  As discussed above, the
traditional generational accounting methodology treats each of these as survivors of those present
in year k.  That is, immigrants have their taxes and transfers attributed to natives of the same
cohort.
A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of Nt,k, one for each existing and
future generation, with the property that the combined present value adds up to the right hand
side of equation (1).  Though we distinguish male and female cohorts in the results presented
below, we suppress sex subscripts in (1) and (2) to ease notation.
Note that generational accounts reflect only taxes paid less transfers received.  With the
occasional exception of government expenditures on education, the accounts presented in past
research typically have not imputed to particular generations the value of the government’s
purchases of goods and services.  Therefore, the accounts do not show the full net benefit or
burden that any generation receives from government policy as a whole, although they can show
a generation’s net benefit or burden from a particular policy change that affects only taxes and
transfers.  Thus generational accounting tells us which generations will pay for government
spending, rather than telling us which generations will benefit from that spending.  Another
characteristic of generational accounting that should be understood at the outset is that, as its
name suggests, it is an accounting exercise that, like deficit accounting, does not incorporate6
induced behavioral effects or macroeconomics responses of policy changes.
5  As a corollary, it
does not incorporate the deadweight loss of taxation in its measure of fiscal burden, again
following the tradition of budget incidence analysis.
The left-hand-side of equation (1) is estimated assuming current projected fiscal policy
and then compared to the right-hand-side.  If the sum of the current and future generational
accounts is smaller in present value than total future government consumption and initial net
debt, current policy is unsustainable and a policy that adjusts at least part of the equation is
required.  There is, of course, no unique way to make this adjustment.  Our base case assumes
that any residual amount needed to satisfy the government’s budget constraint will be borne
entirely by future generations.  The traditional approach has been to spread this burden among
future generations in such a way that the average present value lifetime net tax payment per
initial member of each future generation is constant except for productivity growth.  Again, the
methodology did not account for the fact that some of these taxes would actually be paid by
immigrants, and did not separate the burdens of immigrants from those of natives.
Generational Accounting and Immigration
To take explicit account of the impact of immigrants, we rewrite equation (1), breaking
its components into those attributable to immigrants and those attributable to natives.
                                               
5 For further discussion, see Fehr and Kotlikoff (1999), who consider the impact of general equilibrium effects on
generational accounts, using the Auerbach-Kotlikoff simulation model.  They find that the accounts as normally
calculated typically provide a good approximation of the full general equilibrium impact.  Integrating our
disaggregated accounts into a general equilibrium model is an interesting topic for future research.  Progress in this
direction has been made by Storesletten (1998), who incorporates three skill classes of immigrants in an Auerbach-
Kotlikoff-type simulation model to study to study the impact of changes in the immigration mix on U.S. fiscal
balance.7
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where we now define Nt,t-s to be the account of the native generation born in year t-s, and define
Ft,t-s to be the account for all others born in year t-s.  Expression (2) still provides the definition
of Nt,k, but now the term Ps,k stands for the number of natives born in year k that survive at least
until year s.  Thus, the two sets of terms Ft,k in (3) represent, respectively, the accounts for all
immigrants to existing cohorts and the accounts for all immigrants to future cohorts.  That is,
(4) ) r + (1 Q T   =   F
) - (s -






where k = max(t,k) and Qs,k is the number of immigrants in generation k present in the United
States in year s.  The evolution of this value over time (i.e., holding k fixed and varying s) will
reflect not only mortality, but also additional immigration and out-migration of previous
immigrants.
Because the accounts defined by expression (4) incorporate the net taxes resulting from
additional immigration after year k, there is no simple way to divide them by the associated year-
k population, Qs,k, to produce generational accounts that are comparable to the per-capita
accounts of natives.  For example, because essentially all first-generation immigrants arrive after
age 0, their aggregate age-0 account is attributable to net taxes paid by individuals not in the
population as of age 0; the per capita generational account would appear to be infinite.  Thus,
one should view the construction of the accounts in (4) primarily as a necessary step in deriving
correct accounts for natives.8
Given adequate data, calculation of the burdens on existing generations remains
straightforward after this decomposition: we simply allocate burdens to natives and immigrants
based on the taxes and transfers attributable to each group.  However, for future generations,
which the standard methodology treats as a residual group, there is no obvious analogy to the
procedure used in the no-immigrant case.  We can no longer simply assign to each future native
generation the same (adjusted for growth) per capita generational account, for this leaves open
the question of what adjustment should be imposed on future immigrants.
One approach might be to extend the current assumption used to distinguish future
burdens by sex, requiring that the percentage per capita increase in generational accounts be the
same for natives and immigrants.
6   But this is unappealing given that immigrants have a very
different population structure than natives. Put more simply, it seems implausible that any
realistic policy to raise the fiscal burdens on future generations would have the same percentage
impact on the lifetime fiscal burdens of natives and immigrants.  Immigrants inherently have a
different lifetime pattern of U.S. residence and hence of U.S. taxes and transfers.  Indeed, as
immigrants arrive at different ages, it is not even clear how they should be aggregated to perform
such a calculation.
To deal with this problem, we propose an alternative method of assigning the residual.
The method involves first calculating the burdens on future generations (both native and
immigrant) under current policy, and then adjusting proportionally some combination of taxes
paid and transfers received by these future generations until expression (3) is satisfied.  This
 allocation of the extra burden on future generations typically will yield different percentage
                                               
6 A recent analysis using generational accounting to study immigration in Germany (Bonin et al 1998) did rely an
such an assumption.  That paper also assumed that the age structure of immigrants among future generations was the
same as same as that of current immigrants, an assumption that we do not make here.9
increases for men and women, and for natives and immigrants, but will be based on a concrete
change in actual policy variables.  Because the allocation also depends on the tax or transfer
components being adjusted, we consider different policy combinations, namely proportional
increases in all taxes, proportional decreases in all transfers, or the combination of the two (with
the same proportional changes in taxes and transfers).  We also consider making the proportional
adjustment of taxes and transfers immediately, so that the new policy affects current as well as
future generations.
Data Sources
Construction of generational accounts requires population data and projections, tax and
transfer profiles for different demographic groups within each cohort, projections for the path of
government purchases, a value for the initial stock of government debt, and assumptions about
the government’s discount rate.
For much of this, we rely on the recently updated calculation for the United States by
Gokhale, Page and Sturrock (GPS 1999).  In particular, we use their base year of 1995, their
aggregate projections for the growth of government spending, Gt through the year 2070, based
on the actual long-term CBO forecast.  We benchmark age-based profiles of government
spending used by Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991) to the 2070 aggregate, and assume
that these profiles grow with the rate of labor productivity after 2070.  Thus, government
spending growth is permitted to deviate from the general growth rate to the extent that there are
shifts in the age structure of the population.  We also use GPS’s projections of aggregate taxes
and transfers, based on the CBO forecast through 2070 and assumed to grow with labor
productivity thereafter.  Finally, we use their assumption of a 1.2 percent rate of labor10
productivity growth after 2070, their real discount rate of 6 percent, and their initial value of
g
t W = -$2.1 trillion.
However, GPS’s population projections and their tax and transfer profiles are
disaggregated only by sex, and not by nativity, and so we must supplement them with data from
other sources.  For population projections, we simply use an alternative source that provides
information at a more disaggregate level.  For tax and transfer profiles, we combine the
information in GPS with that provided by another data source.
Our alternative population projections were provided by Barry Edmonston, based on an
adaptation of the population projection model used in the recent National Research Council
study (1997, Appendix 3.A).  The model generates annual population projections through the
year 2100, broken down by age, sex and nativity, the last of which has three categories of
nativity: first-generation immigrants, second-generation immigrants (i.e., native children of
immigrants) and all others, to whom we refer simply as natives.  We assume a stationary
population after 2100.
7
Tax and transfer profiles also broken down by nativity come from estimates by Lee and
Miller (1997).  However, as these profiles were broken down by nativity but not by sex, and the
profiles in Gokhale et al were broken down by sex but not by nativity, we developed an
algorithm, described in the Appendix below, to use the two sets of profiles in conjunction to
generate tax and transfer profiles disaggregated by both sex and nativity.  The algorithm requires
additional assumptions regarding relative patterns across nativity groups.  We choose the
restriction that the male-female ratio for each per capita tax or transfer component is constant at
                                               
7 Whether we specify the population to be constant after 2100 or 2200 does not significantly alter our results. The
present-value nature of generational accounting places relatively little weight on projections that far in the future.11
each age across the three nativity groups.   For example, we assume that the ratio of income taxes
per age-46 male to income taxes per age-46 female is the same for first-generation immigrants,
second-generation immigrants, and natives.
Initial Results: Impact of the Change in Methodology
Table 1 presents generational accounts constructed under different assumptions, to
illustrate the impact of the change in methodology just described.  For each simulation, the table
presents the generational accounts for existing generations of males and females, at five-year
intervals, and the accounts for future generations implied by the need to satisfy intertemporal
fiscal balance.  Our base year is 1995; those born in 1995 represent age 0 in the table, and future
generations begin with those born in 1996.
The first two columns present the accounts for males and females based on the traditional
methodology, using the aggregate male and female tax and transfer profiles from GPS but our
alternative population projections.  The accounts for existing generations show the standard
pattern, higher in general for men than women and rising and then falling with age as taxes and
then transfers because a more significant factor.  They also show an imbalance between current
and future generations of 54 percent, somewhat lower than the imbalance of 72 found by GPS.
The explanation lies in our faster projected population growth.  With the initial debt level and
projected growth in aggregate government purchases through 2070 held fixed, higher population
translates into lower per capita burdens.
The next set of calculations shows the impact of the alternative method of allocating the
residual burden to future generations, by cutting all transfers and increasing all taxes in an
equiproportional manner.  The accounts in these columns still aggregate the taxes and transfers
of immigrants with those of natives.  Because the only change here is in the allocation of burden12
among future generations, the accounts for existing generations are unchanged.   Listed below
the accounts for current generations are the percent increase in taxes and cut in transfers, as well
as the corresponding percentage increases, relative to current newborns, in the accounts of future
generations of males and females.  Note that the percentage increases in the generational
accounts are no longer equal for males and females, because the new methodology adjusts taxes
and transfers, rather than overall burdens, proportionally.  As can be seen by inspection of (2)
and the definition of the net tax payment Ts,k, increasing the accounts proportionally, regardless
of the pattern of taxes and transfers, would require an equal percentage increase in all taxes and
an equal percentage increase in all transfers.
8  Moreover, this approach doesn’t necessarily
impose an equal per capita net tax burden (adjusted for growth) on all future generations.  Even
though tax and transfer profiles are the same, changes in mortality (and, in this simulation,
immigration patterns as well) will cause different generations to have different lifetime tax
burdens.  Thus, the “future generation” listed in the table refers to the first future generation
only, the cohort born in 1996.  Given the change in methodology, there is no assurance that the
burden on future generations will be the same as in the first simulation, and indeed the burdens
on future males and females born in 1996 are projected to be higher here for both males and
females.  The explanation for this increase lies primarily in the fact that members of later
generations are projected to live longer.  As longer life translates into an increase in transfer
payments and hence a decline in net tax liabilities, a greater share of the fiscal burden must be
placed on the initial future generations, while the burden on later generations will be smaller.
                                               
8 Indeed, the traditional approach, in implicitly raising taxes and raising transfers proportionally, can lead to strange
results.  For example, if current newborn males have positive generational accounts and females have negative
generational accounts, and burdens must be raised on future generations, the standard methodology calls for making
the burdens on females more negative.13
The last set of calculations, presented in the table’s last two columns, illustrates the
further impact of distinguishing immigrants from others in the population.
9  It presents the
generational accounts for natives based on expression (3), from the model in which the
generational accounts of first- and second-generation immigrants are calculated separately.
Looking first at the accounts for current generations, we note that these accounts do not follow a
consistent pattern relative to those in the previous two columns, based on aggregate native and
immigrant populations.  These changes are due to two factors.  First, the profiles of taxes and
transfers for natives are slightly different from those based on the total population.  However, as
Figures 1(for males) and 2 (for females) show, the differences are not large, in part because the
total population is dominated by natives.  The second source of difference in the two methods of
computing generational accounts is the fact that the populations used previously include varying
shares of natives and immigrants at different ages.  In particular, as Figure 3 shows, the
immigrant share of the elderly in the base year is higher than that for the general population; a
similar patterns exists for later years.  Because the elderly are net transfer recipients, the previous
methodology tends to overstate the transfers expected by those in middle age, for it attributes to a
primarily native group the future transfers received by both natives and immigrants.  This
explains why the accounts in the last set of columns are higher in middle age.
Thus, considering immigrants and natives separately does affect our estimates of
generational accounts.  However, because this methodology also separates immigrants from
future generations of natives, the net impact of the correction on our estimate of generational
imbalance is minor.  This can be seen by comparing the “% difference” values for males and
females in the last two columns of the table with those in the previous two columns.
                                               
9 The program used to produce these simulations, written to run using MATLAB version 5, is available at the web
site of the Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance (http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/burch/).14
At the bottom of these last two columns are the accounts for the first future native
generation.  As explained when discussing the previous set of results, these accounts reflect a
larger imbalance than was obtained using the traditional method because greater longevity of
subsequent generations reduces their generational accounts.  This trend is evident in Figure 4,
which graphs the accounts for males and females for future generations, beginning with the
generation born in 1996.
In addition to the scenario just considered, in which all taxes and transfers are adjusted,
the last two columns also present the accounts for the first future generation under the two
alternative scenarios in which only taxes or only transfers are adjusted.  When taxes and transfers
are adjusted, a 42 percent increase in taxes and cut in transfers is required to restore fiscal
balance.  This is the same percent change required in the previous case, when immigrants were
not considered separately, because there has been no change in policy or in aggregate population
projections – we are simply separating the burdens on natives and immigrants in our reporting.
A 58 percent increase in taxes or a 153 percent cut in transfers (not feasible using transfers alone,
of course) would be required if either set of instruments were adjusted separately.  While all
three policies have similar impacts on current generations, note that the policy of adjusting only
taxes falls more heavily on males, while that of adjusting only transfers falls more heavily on
females.
These results suggest that the conclusions in past studies that ignored the presence of
immigrant populations have not been significantly biased.  However, with the new technique, we
are now in a position to evaluate the impact of changes in immigration policy.15
The Impact of Immigration
What impact would a change in immigration have on the fiscal burdens of current and
future generations? To address this question, we must first specify the exact change in policy
envisioned.  While we do not consider it a realistic policy option, simply halting all immigration
in the year 2000 provides a useful polar case for analyzing the impact of less extreme changes in
policy as well.  Thus, we consider such a policy, based on an alternative set of projections
provided by Barry Edmonston, which takes account not only of the direct effect of a drop in first-
generation immigrants, but also the drop in the second-generation immigrant and native
descendents of these excluded immigrants.
It is also necessary to specify a fiscal policy environment in which the change in
immigration policy takes place.  We consider two such environments.  In the first, the burden of
the government’s intertemporal fiscal imbalance falls entirely on future generations.  This
corresponds to the simulations reported in Table 1.  In the second fiscal environment,
government’s fiscal policy is assumed to change immediately, with taxes being raised and
transfers being cut on all generations from the base year onward, until the government’s fiscal
imbalance is eliminated, under the current immigration scenario.  This policy leaves the current
newborn and first future native generations with roughly the same generational accounts,
adjusted for growth.  The accounts for the first future generation are slightly lower, reflecting
their greater life expectancy and the predominance of transfer payments during the last years of
life.  Note, too, that this policy implies a much lower burden on future generations than does the
other scenario.
The impact of these alternative fiscal scenarios may be seen by comparing the first two
and last two columns in Table 2, which present the burdens on current and future generations of16
males and females under the alternative fiscal policies.
10  The first row under “future
generations” corresponds to the case of present immigration policy.  Reading across the table, we
observe that stabilizing fiscal policy would require an increase in $7,600 in the burden on
newborn males, and $5,900 in the burden on newborn females, corresponding to an immediate 6
percent increase in all taxes and a 6 percent cut in all transfers.
11  This immediate adjustment
would permit a significant drop in the burdens on future generations.
Now, consider the impact of eliminating immigration.
12  Eliminating immigrants also
eliminates the taxes they pay and the transfers they receive.  It may also have some impact on the
level of government purchases, depending on what we wish to assume about the nature of these
goods (i.e., “public” goods vs. “private” goods) and how their provision changes with
population.  Initially, we assume that government purchase profiles remain constant, meaning,
for example, that a reduction in the population size with no change in population structure will
induce a reduction of equal proportion in the level of government purchases.
Under this assumption about government purchases, the impact of eliminating
immigration is shown in the second set of numbers labeled “future generations” in Table 2.  For
the fiscal scenario that allocates the entire burden to future generations, eliminating immigration
hurts the remaining population, raising the burden on males by $4,300 and the burden on females
by $3,400.  Thus, immigration is helpful in restoring fiscal balance.  However, this picture
changes under the alternative assumption that fiscal policy is immediately adjusted to institute
                                               
10 The results in this table were originally presented in Auerbach and Oreopoulos (1999).
11 For this and all other simulations in the second set of columns in Table 2, the “% change” lists two numbers, the
first being the policy change imposed on current generations, the second being the policy change imposed on future
generations.  The first number equals the policy change that, when imposed on current and future generations,
initially (under current immigration policy) balances fiscal policy.  In Table 1, and in the first set of columns of
Table 2, the first of these numbers is always 0 (and hence not listed separately), as all imbalances are imposed on
future generations.
12 This policy simulation also eliminates the return migration of immigrants already in the United States.17
balance under present immigration policy.   As shown in the table’s last two columns,
eliminating immigration now reduces the burdens of those that remain in future generations,
implying that a smaller adjustment would have been needed with immigrants absent; future
generations of males gain $4,100, and females gain $3,100.
What explains the difference for the two fiscal policies?  It is helpful to consider this in
the context of expression (3), the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.  Under the
“responsible” fiscal policy scenario, more of the burden is being placed on current generations,
who make up the first term on the left-hand side of (3), and less on future generations, who make
up the second term on the left-hand side.  Immigrants in future generations are primarily new
immigrants (whose presence in the United States would be eliminated by the reform)
13, while
those in current generations include some new immigrants but also all immigrants already
present in the United States.  Hence, new immigrants account for a greater fraction of this second
term than of the first: their fiscal contribution, relative to that of others in the population, is
weighted more strongly toward future generations.  Thus, their average contribution is lower
under the policy of immediate adjustment, which raises burdens on those included in both terms,
than under the policy of “letting future generations pay,” which raises burdens only on those
accounted for by the second term.  Therefore, eliminating new immigrants from the population
has a more favorable impact under the scenario of immediate fiscal adjustment.  Put another
way, with immediate fiscal adjustment, each immigrant’s net contribution to fiscal balance is
negative, taking account of the associated change in government purchases.
This conclusion hinges, of course, on our assumption regarding the change in government
purchases, and in some sense represents an extreme case in which there are no economies of
                                               
13 We say “primarily” because, under the policy considered, there will still be some second-generation immigrants
born in the future to first-generation immigrant parents who arrived before the elimination of immigration.18
scale in the consumption of the goods and services government provides.  While this may be a
reasonable assumption for some government provided goods, there may be others for which their
“public-goods” nature implies significant economies of scale in consumption.  To evaluate the
importance of this issue, we consider the alternative extreme assumption that all spending on
defense, roughly 25 percent of all government purchases, is purely “public” in nature, and does
not vary at all with the size of the immigrant population.  This means that eliminating
immigrants has no impact on this portion of government purchases, which will make reducing
immigration appear less attractive from the fiscal perspective.
The last set of numbers labeled “future generations” in Table 2 illustrates the impact of
this change in assumption.  Now, eliminating immigration after the year 2000 increases the fiscal
losses under the “irresponsibility” scenario, and converts the gains to losses under the
“responsibility” scenario.  In the latter case, the losses to future generations from eliminating
immigration are $2,200 for males and $1,700 for females.  It is also possible to express this
impact of immigration in terms of its impact on all generations, not just future generations.  That
is, we estimate the increase in generational accounts that would result from the immediate
adjustment of taxes and transfers – on all generations – required by a ban on immigration.  For
the scenario that holds defense spending fixed, the answer (not shown in the table) is $300 for
each newborn male and $200 for each newborn female (growing with the economy over time),
much smaller than the corresponding values of $2,200 and $1,700 if the burden fell only on
future generations.  Whichever way this calculation is done, the measured impact is very small
relative to the size of the overall fiscal imbalance, respectively equal to $49,700 for newborn
males and $38,000 for newborn females.  Given the many other assumptions inherent in the
calculation, the sign of this effect is uncertain.19
To examine this sensitivity, we present in Table 4 the results of simulations for
alternative interest rate and growth rate assumptions, reporting the percentage change in taxes
and transfers for the six cases (two fiscal policy scenarios and three immigration scenarios).  In
all cases, immigration is beneficial when fiscal policy is irresponsible – that is, when all
additional net tax payments required to satisfy the government’s budget constraint are made by
future generations.  In all cases, immigration is has essentially no effect or is slightly harmful
when fiscal policy has been adjusted immediately and there are no economies of scale in the
consumption of government goods and services.  However, adding the assumption that defense
spending is unaffected by immigration again leads to the conclusion, in all cases, that
immigration is fiscally beneficial.  As in the base case (repeated in bold in each table), the fiscal
impact of immigration continues to be quite small relative to the overall imbalance facing future
generations under current policy.  The size of the gain decreases with increases in the discount
rate.  It also generally declines with the growth rate.
We also performed sensitivity analysis with respect to the method of fiscal adjustment
(only taxes or only transfers, rather than taxes and transfers).  This variation also does not affect
the pattern of fiscal impacts; for each type of fiscal adjustment, immigration is beneficial except
when fiscal policy is immediately adjusted and defense spending changes with the size of the
immigrant population.
Although it is not surprising in light of the use of common data sources, these results are
consistent with those presented in the report of the National Research Council (1997).  For a 3
percent discount rate, that study found a small positive impact of immigration under similar
assumptions about the existence of some public goods and the assumption of immediate
stabilization of the debt-GDP ratio.  This assumption is related to our policy of equalizing the20
burdens on current and future generations, although the two assumptions lead to different
patterns of tax increases over time.   Using a somewhat different estimation approach, it
calculated that each U.S. native would achieve a net tax reduction of $30 if immigration
increased by 100,000 individuals per year.  This is roughly a 12 percent increase in immigration
from projected levels, and hence a policy about one-eighth the size of our policy that ends
immigration.  Multiplying $30 by 8 yields a number almost exactly equal to our average for
males and females for the case in which fiscal policy is initially in balance and all generations
share the burden or benefit of any policy change.
That study, too, found that gains decreased with a rise in the discount rate.  It also found
that immigrants represented a fiscal drag if no plan to stabilize the debt-GDP ratio were in place.
In our terminology, this would correspond to an experiment not considered, roughly to grouping
immigrants and their descendents with current generations before determining the residual
burden to be allocated to the remaining members of future generations.  In contrast, we have
found here that shifting the burden of adjusting an unsustainable fiscal policy onto all future
generations makes the presence of immigrants a major benefit.  Thus, the fiscal benefit of
immigration may be positive or negative, but becomes more positive with delays in addressing
the current U.S. fiscal imbalance.  However, we have also found that the impact of immigration,
regardless of the assumptions regarding the discount rate, the timing and nature of fiscal
adjustment, or the existence of government public goods, is very small in comparison to the
overall adjustment that would be required to eliminate the entire fiscal imbalance.  Given that the
simulations presented consider the impact of a complete elimination of immigration, it is clear
that the impact of a much smaller change in the rate of immigration would correspondingly have
even smaller effects on fiscal balance.21
We have not considered changes in immigration policy aimed at altering the skill mix of
immigrants, rather than their number.  Highly educated immigrants, who accounts for a relatively
small proportion of all immigrants, make much larger net fiscal contributions per capita than the
typical immigrant (National Research Council 1997).  Thus, as suggested by simulations in
Storesletten (1998), an increase in the number of highly skilled immigrants would contribute
much more to fiscal balance than the increase we have considered, which holds the skill mix of
immigrants constant.
Conclusion
We may summarize our results with three findings, which are robust to differences in
assumption regarding the government discount rate, the economy’s growth rate, and the extent to
which fiscal adjustments are made by changes taxes or transfer payments.
First, whether immigration contributes to or helps alleviate fiscal stress depends on the
extent to which that stress will be borne by future generations.  Because new immigrants
represent a larger fraction of future generations than of present ones, shifting the burden onto
future generations also shifts it, relatively, onto new immigrants.  Thus, if the entire fiscal
imbalance currently estimated for the United States is placed on future generations, then the
presence of new immigrants reduces the burden borne by natives.
Second, when a policy of “fiscal responsibility” is followed, with taxes and/or transfers
adjusted immediately on all generations to restore the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint, the fiscal gain from immigration is reduced.  Indeed, whether there is a gain at all
depends on the extent to which government purchases rise with the immigrant population.  We
considered two relatively extreme cases.  When defense spending rises in proportion to22
population size, immigration worsens the fiscal imbalance.  When defense spending is a “pure”
public good, unaffected by population size, immigration lessens the fiscal imbalance.
Third, the impact of immigration on fiscal balance is extremely small relative to the size
of the overall imbalance itself.  Thus, immigration should be viewed neither as a major source of
the existing imbalance, nor as a potential solution to it.
In producing these results, we have also extended the methodology of generational
accounting to accommodate heterogeneity among members of current and future generations
other than the distinction by sex that has been present in prior work.  To deal with the very
different tax and transfer profiles of immigrants and natives, we developed an alternative method
of calculating fiscal imbalance that does not require the assumption of equal percentage changes
in lifetime tax burdens.  An obvious application of this methodology would be to the
construction of generational accounts that recognize other forms of heterogeneity within
generations, notably by lifetime income class.23
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Appendix
This appendix describes the method used to combine two sets of tax/transfer profiles, one
broken down only by age and sex and the other broken down by age and nativity, to generate
estimated profiles broken down by age, sex and nativity.  Our procedure is the same for each age,
and so age is omitted from the discussion.  The algorithm uses data from three sources.  The first
set of data is population projections, provided by Barry Edmonston.  These projections are
broken down by nativity i (equal to 1, 2, or 3 for first-generation immigrants, second-generation
immigrants, and all others) and sex j (taking a value of m for males or f for females), 
i
j P .  The
second set of data is the tax and transfer profiles by sex, used by Gokhale et al (GPS 1999).
These profiles,  j r  (j = m,f) are expressed as ratios, normalized by the values for 40-year-old
males.  The third set of data is the tax and transfer profiles by nativity, constructed by Lee and
Miller (1997), which we denote T
i (i=1, 2, 3).  We seek to use these data to construct normalized
profiles for taxes and transfer by sex and nativity,
i
j r .
Before applying our algorithm to combine these two sets of profiles, it is necessary for us
to make their categories compatible.  GPS apply profiles that have been used and described in
earlier generational accounting work for the United States, for example Auerbach et al (1991).
Each male and female at each age is assigned a profile, relative to that of a 40-year-old male, for
6 categories of taxes (labor income, FICA, excise, capital income, property and seignorage) and
7 categories of transfer payments (OASDI, Medicare, Medicaid, UI, general welfare, AFDC, and
food stamps).  For purposes of estimating government expenditures (which are not included in
the generational accounts), the methodology uses separate federal and state and local government25
purchase profiles.  Our calculations are based on these same tax, transfer and government
consumption groupings, although we wish to distinguish by immigrant status as well.
To construct profiles for immigrants, we use average per capita amounts from Lee and
Miller (1997) for first- and second-generation immigrants and natives, for males and females
combined.
14  However, these profile categories are broader than the ones used by GPS.  For
taxes, these are: state and federal income, FICA, property, sales, federal business and excise
taxes.  For transfers, 25 different local, state, and federal programs are used; OASDI, Medicare,
Medicaid (noninstitutional), Medicaid (institutional), SSI, AFDC, school lunch, food stamps,
Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), energy
assistance, rent subsidy, public housing, earned income tax credit, unemployment insurance,
elementary and high school, bilingual education, public college, federal student aid, incarceration
costs, federal retirement, military retirement, railroad retirement, workers’ compensation state
and local retirement, and refugee assistance.
Lee and Miller aggregate individuals into five-year age groups, beginning from 15-19
and ending with 80+.  To convert their data into individual age amounts, we assume that
individual cohorts in each five-year age grouping have identical values, and that those cohorts
under 15 have the same values as the 15-19 group.
The categories are then aggregated to fit those used by GPS by adding the per capita
amounts. For example, federal and state income taxes are combined into one category, while
institutional and noninstitutional Medicaid expenditures are combined into another. Many of the
smaller categories from Lee and Miller were reclassified as part of either state or federal
government consumption.
                                               
14 See also National Research Council (1997) for a detailed discussion of these profiles.26
To construct the normalized tax and transfer profiles by sex and nativity,
i
j r , we start by
requiring that they be consistent with the two sets of profiles we already have; that is:
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This gives us four equations in the six unknowns, 
i
j r .  To obtain the two additional equations
needed for a solution, we assume that the relative profiles for males and females are the same
across the three groups, i.e.,













Using these six equations for each age group, we solve for the relative profiles by sex, immigrant
status, and age, which are used in turn to compute the generational accounts.Table 1.  Generational Accounts: Alternative Methodologies
(in thousands of dollars; r=.06, g=.012)
Method:







Age Males Females Males Females Males Females
0 77.4 52.9 77.4 52.9 71.6 49.6
5 98.3 65.9 98.3 65.9 91.2 61.5
10 122.0 80.6 122.0 80.6 114.7 76.1
15 152.6 99.3 152.6 99.3 145.2 94.6
20 186.0 118.8 186.0 118.8 180.9 115.2
25 205.2 128.0 205.2 128.0 203.9 127.4
30 203.8 124.0 203.8 124.0 206.2 126.1
35 195.4 116.9 195.4 116.9 200.0 121.1
40 177.3 102.0 177.3 102.0 183.6 108.1
45 143.9 74.9 143.9 74.9 148.9 79.9
50 97.2 38.5 97.2 38.5 100.5 42.4
55 39.2 -5.4 39.2 -5.4 39.6 -3.7
60 -26.3 -52.9 -26.3 -52.9 -27.0 -52.3
65 -78.4 -89.1 -78.4 -89.1 -80.5 -90.3
70 -87.8 -94.7 -87.8 -94.7 -88.6 -95.0
75 -85.1 -92.0 -85.1 -92.0 -83.1 -90.8
80 -73.2 -80.5 -73.2 -80.5 -72.4 -79.9
85 -64.1 -66.0 -64.1 -66.0 -63.9 -65.9
90 -49.4 -49.8 -49.4 -49.8 -49.1 -49.7
Future
Generations 119.5 81.7
  % difference         54 72 80 69 77
Taxes & Transfers 132.9 95.3 121.3 87.6
  % change         42         42
Taxes only 124.0 87.5
  % change        58
Transfers only 113.9 88.0
  % change       153Table 2.  Generational Accounts: The Impact of Immigration
(in thousands of dollars; r=.06, g=.012)




Age Males Females Males Females
0 71.6 49.6 79.2 55.5
5 91.2 61.5 100.7 68.6
10 114.7 76.1 126.3 84.8
15 145.2 94.6 159.3 105.1
20 180.9 115.2 197.9 127.8
25 203.9 127.4 222.9 141.1
30 206.2 126.1 225.5 139.8
35 200.0 121.1 219.2 134.7
40 183.6 108.1 202.4 121.6
45 148.9 79.9 166.6 93.1
50 100.5 42.4 116.8 55.1
55 39.6 -3.7 54.5 8.6
60 -27.0 -52.3 -13.2 -40.0
65 -80.5 -90.3 -67.6 -78.3
70 -88.6 -95.0 -77.4 -84.5
75 -83.1 -90.8 -73.9 -82.0
80 -72.4 -79.9 -65.3 -72.9
85 -63.9 -65.9 -58.7 -60.6
90 -49.1 -49.7 -45.1 -45.6
Immigration Policy
Assumption:
Burdens on Future Generations
(and percent changes in taxes and transfers)
Baseline 121.3 87.6 79.0 55.2
     % change (current/future)         42         6/6
No Immigration after 2000 125.6 91.0 74.9 52.1
     % change (current/future)         46         6/3
No Immigration after 2000;
defense a public good 131.9 95.8 81.2 56.9
     % change (current/future)         51         6/8Table 3. Burdens on Future Generations: Alternative Fiscal Policies
(in thousands of dollars; r=.06, g=.012)








Baseline 121.3 87.6 79.0 55.2
     % change         42         6/6
No Immigration after 2000 125.6 91.0 74.9 52.1
     % change         46         6/3
No Immigration after 2000;
defense a public good 131.9 95.8 81.2 56.9
     % change         51         6/8
Taxes Only
Baseline 124.0 87.5 80.5 55.9
     % change         58       10/10
No Immigration after 2000 128.0 90.4 76.3 52.9
     % change         62        10/5
No Immigration after 2000;
defense a public good 134.5 95.1 82.8 57.6
     % change         69       10/13
Transfers Only
Baseline 113.9 88.0 76.3 53.8
     % change        153       18/18
No Immigration after 2000 119.1 92.7 72.7 50.6
     % change        172        18/5
No Immigration after 2000;
defense a public good 124.7 97.8 78.3 55.6
     % change        192       18/25Table 4.  Percentage Change In Taxes and Transfers: Sensitivity Analysis
Interest
Rate:
.03 .03 .03 .06 .06 .06 .09 .09 .09
Growth
Rate:
.007 .012 .017 .007 .012 .017 .007 .012 .017
                     Immediate Fiscal Policy Change?
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